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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
Scott H. Michalove**
and
James S. Trieschmann, Jr.***
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article discusses case law and legislative developments in
Georgia real property law during the current survey period. Since the
last survey period, a stringent predatory lending law has come and gone,
and the courts have decided numerous cases with real property issues.
Not every case decided nor every statute enacted can be discussed. The
cases and legislation discussed below were chosen for their significance
to real property law and their significance to any attorney who either
regularly, or from time to time, practices in the field of real property.
II.

LEGISLATION

A.

The FairLending Act
Once again predatory lending proved to be a contentious issue for the
Georgia General Assembly. Despite the charged nature of the debate,
the general assembly passed significant amendments to the Georgia Fair
Lending Act.' The most important of these amendments removed
assignees from the Act's definition of "creditor" and thus limited the
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potential liability of assignees of loans governed by the Act.2 The
damages available to a borrower on a high cost home loan from an
assignee were capped at "the amount of all remaining indebtedness of
the borrower under such loan"' plus the attorney fees incurred by the
borrower.4 The amendments eliminated the ability of borrowers to
bring class actions against assignees.5 The amendments also created a
safe harbor for assignees who can demonstrate that they exercised due
diligence in an effort not to purchase high-cost home loans.'
The amendments make the "anti-flipping" provisions of the Fair
Lending Act applicable only when the new loan is a high-cost home
loan.' The amendments also significantly modified the Act's definition
of "points and fees" by removing fees paid to governmental agencies for
mortgage insurance from the definition." The amendments also added
a parity provision to the Fair Lending Act, exempting state chartered
depository institutions from compliance with the Act if similar federally
chartered institutions are exempt due to federal preemption.9
B. Limitation of Damages When Foreclosure Sale of Property is
Rescinded
Prior to the 2003 legislative session there was a "gray area" regarding
rescission of foreclosure sales that should not have taken place because
of bankruptcy or reinstatement or satisfaction of the loan. To correct
this problem (and as a part of consumer-friendly legislation), the Georgia
legislature enacted a statute that allows a seller to rescind a foreclosure
sale within thirty days after that sale but before the deed or deed under
power is delivered to the purchaser.' ° The statute does not address
whether the deed is recorded; it speaks only to delivery of the deed."
For an eligible sale to be rescinded, the seller must return all bid
funds paid by the purchaser within five days of the sale. 12 The statute
also provides for a limitation on damages recoverable by purchasers.' 3

2. Id. § 7-6A-2(6).
3. Id. § 7-6A-6(c)(1).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. § 7-6A-6(b).
7. Id. § 7-6A-4(a).
8. Id. § 7-6A-2(12)(G)(iii). This change was intended to remove fees paid on Federal
Housing Administration and Veterans Affairs loans from the calculation of points and fees.
9. Id. § 7-6A-12..
10. O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1(a) (Supp. 2003).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 9-13-172.1(b).
13. Id. § 9-13-172.1(c).
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If the sale is rescinded because the borrower filed for bankruptcy
protection, the buyer's damages are limited to the amount of the bid
funds tendered at the sale.14 If the sale is rescinded because (1) the
statutory requirements were not fulfilled; (2) the default leading to the
sale was cured prior to the sale; or (3) the lender and the borrower
agreed prior to the sale to cancel the sale based upon an enforceable
promise by the borrower to cure the default, then the damages that can
be awarded to a purchaser are limited to the amount of the bid funds
plus interest on the funds at the rate of eighteen percent annually,
calculated daily.15 Specific performance, that is, requiring the lender
to conclude the sale, is specifically excluded by the statute as a remedy
available to a third party purchaser."
Title to Mobile Homes
In Georgia, until May 2003, manufactured (mobile) homes were
considered personal property; no formal procedure was available to
convert the title to mobile homes into title to real property. Mobile
homes were treated as personal property for security purposes even
though they may have served as collateral for deeds secured by real
property.17 By statute enacted in May 2003, a procedure was created
to convert mobile homes from personal to real property.1" Conversion
of mobile home collateral from chattel to realty status was problematic
for lenders because mortgage investor guidelines required that loan
collateral be comprised of realty and not chattel. 9
The statute provides that a mobile home as personal property shall
convert to real property if the mobile home is or is to be permanently
affixed to realty, and persons with ownership in the mobile home also
have an ownership interest in the realty.20 The owner of the mobile
home and all holders of security interests must execute and file a
Certificate of Permanent Location in the real estate records of the county
where the land is located and with the commissioner of motor vehicle
safety.2 1 The clerk of court records the certificate in the same manner
C.

14. Id.
15. Id. § 9-13-172.1(d).
16. Id.
17. Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 00-8 (2000).
18. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-181 (Supp. 2003).
19. See Announcement 03-06, Fannie Mae, Mortgage Eligibility and Servicing
Procedures for Mortgages Secured by Manufactured Homes at 2 (June 3, 2003) [hereinafter
Fannie Mae Announcement] (on file with the Mercer Law Review); Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation Announcement (2003).
20. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-181(b)(1) (Supp. 2003).
21. Id. § 8-2-181(b)(2).
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as other instruments that affect real property and indexes the certificate
under the name of the owner in the grantor and grantee indexes." The
clerk must provide the owner with a certified copy of the certificate upon
the payment of fees typically charged for such copies.2"
The Certificate of Permanent Location, when properly completed,
includes the names and addresses of the owner of the mobile home and
any lienholders.2 4 The certificate also contains the title number of the
home (vehicle identification number), a legal description of the land, and
any other data the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) may require.2 5
Upon receipt of a certified copy of Certificate of Permanent Location
and the certificate of title, the commissioner of the DMV must file and
retain a copy of the certificates together with all other prior title
records.2 6 The statute requires no other filing of the title. When the
Certificate of Permanent Location is filed, the DMV must issue
confirmation to the superior court clerk that the certificate has been filed
and the certificate of title has been surrendered. 27 The clerk then
provides a copy of the Certificate of Permanent Location to the county
tax assessors or other entity responsible for tax valuation, and the
property should then be taxed as part of the realty.28 The statute does
not distinguish mobile
homes used for rental from mobile homes used as
29
homestead property.
Once the preceding steps are completed, for all legal purposes, the
mobile home is treated as a part of the realty where it is located.30
Completion of these steps should satisfy the mortgage investor requirements of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.31
III.

TITLE TO LAND

In Bonner v. Norwest Bank Minnesota N.A.,32 Gertrude Paige, a
widow, executed a warranty deed in 1990 conveying one hundred acres
to her niece, Laura Bonner, creating a joint tenancy with a right of
survivorship. At about the same time, the Phillips, who occupied the

22. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-182(a) (Supp. 2003).
23. Id.
24. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-181(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2003).
25. Id. § 8-2-181(c)(3)-(5).
26. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-182(b) (Supp. 2003).
27. Id. § 8-2-182(c).
28. Id. § 8-2-182(d).
29. See O.C.G.A. § 8-2-180 (Supp. 2003).
30. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-183(a) (Supp. 2003).
31. See Fannie Mae Announcement, supra note 19, at 4-6; Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation Announcement, supra note 19.
32. 275 Ga. 620, 571 S.E.2d 387 (2002).
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land (the occupants), became interested in purchasing a one-acre tract.
The occupants contacted Alvin Paige, Ms. Paige's brother-in-law, and
asked him to negotiate with his sister-in-law on their behalf. According
to the occupants, an agreement was reached to purchase the acre for
$1000, after which the occupants sought financing to build a house on
the property. The sale of the property went forward, and Mr. Paige
attended the closing, claiming he had authority to execute all documents
on behalf of Ms. Paige and his deceased brother to convey the one-acre
tract. The deed of transfer was notarized and recorded. Actually, Mr.
Paige had no such authority, and the transaction was made without the
knowledge of either Ms. Paige or Ms. Bonner. In February 1992 Ms.
Paige and Ms. Bonner discovered that the occupants had built a home
and were residing on the property. Neither, however, took action at the
time of the discovery. Ms. Paige died in 1994. s 3
In 1998 the occupants refinanced the loan secured by the one-acre
tract and executed a security deed in favor of Norwest Bank and
Ameriquest Mortgage Company (the lenders). The loan went into default,
and the lenders foreclosed in September 1999. The lenders obtained title
to the property pursuant to the power of sale provision in the security
deed and recorded a deed under power to evidence the foreclosure and
transfer of title. Subsequently, Ms. Bonner informed the lenders that
she claimed the property, and she brought suit to quiet title. After a
hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
lenders.'
The supreme court's analysis of the transaction determined that the
fact that the original conveyance to the occupants was fraudulent was
immaterial. 5
Instead, the court focused on the legitimacy of the
transaction by the lenders and the deed after foreclosure, which
transferred title to the lenders.3 6 The court held that the foreclosure
deed (as opposed to the original deed purportedly from Ms. Paige and
her late husband to the occupants) was not fraudulent or forged, noting
that it was undisputed that the lenders were bona fide purchasers for
value. 37 Accordingly, "'[a] grantee in a security deed who acts in good
faith stands in the attitude of a bona fide purchaser, and is entitled to
the same protection. '' 3' The analysis of bona fide purchasers continued

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
(1943)).

at 620-21, 571 S.E.2d at 387.
at 621, 571 S.E.2d at 387-88.
at 622, 571 S.E.2d at 388.
at 621-22, 571 S.E.2d at 388.
at 621, 571 S.E.2d at 388.
(quoting Roop Grocery Co. v. Gentry, 195 Ga. 736, 745, 25 S.E.2d 705, 711
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with the court holding that "'[w]here a purchaser of land from one in
possession, who holds a deed thereto that is absolute on its face, has
paid the purchase-price and taken possession, parties claiming an equity
therein of which the purchaser had no notice are not entitled to have the
purchaser's deed cancel[1]ed.' ' 39 Therefore, the court concluded that in
this matter, whether the occupants' deed was fraudulent was irrelevant.40 Further, whether the occupants themselves had knowledge of
the fraud was of little consequer.ce because the "'general rule is that a
bona fide purchaser for value at a judicial sale will be
protected although
41
the grantee in a security deed is guilty of fraud.'"
In Hartwell Railroad Co. v. Barnes,42 the supreme court reversed the
trial court's judgment based on a special master's findings and held that
an award of property as year's support was insufficient to divest a
railroad of its interest in property.43 Although the documents found in
the county real estate records were unclear, the records showed that
when Samuel Knox died in 1870, his wife Mary Knox received a life
estate in the homeplace with the couple's children holding the remainder
interest. In 1878 the Elberton Air Line Railroad, appellant's predecessor
in interest (the Railroad Company), received a deed from Mary Knox
conveying, in fee simple, a two-hundred-foot strip across the property.
Mary Knox died in 1886, and the property was treated by all parties as
if she had owned it in fee simple rather than merely as a life estate.
Records indicate that an order was sought and granted whereby the
"homeplace was divided into nine lots and sold at public sale in fee
simple to nine separate purchasers, including a predecessor in title to""
Barnes, the appellee. 4
The trial court appointed a special master, who was called upon to
determine how Mary Knox, who inherited only a life estate, obtained fee
simple title to the property by the time of her death. 46 After reviewing
the deed book records and probate records, "the special master reasoned
that the change in Mary Knox's ownership interest in the property, from
life estate to fee simple, was the result of Mary Knox exercising her right
to a year's support and obtaining fee simple title to the property as part

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. (quoting Beecher v. Carter, 189 Ga. 234, 234, 5 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1939)).
Id. at 622, 571 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. (quoting Kouros v. Sewell, 225 Ga. 487, 488, 169 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1969)).
276 Ga. 246, 577 S.E.2d 566 (2003).
Id. at 248, 577 S.E.2d at 568.
Id. at 247, 577 S.E.2d at 567.
Id. at 246-47, 577 S.E.2d at 567.
Id. at 247, 577 S.E.2d at 567.
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of the award."4 7 The trial court adopted the special master's conclusion
and found in favor of Barnes.48
The supreme court agreed with the special master's conclusion "that
an award of year's support provide[d] the best explanation, in light of
the documentary evidence available for why Mary Knox owned the
property in fee simple at the time of her death."4 9 The court, however,
did not agree that this explanation demanded the special master's
conclusion that the "award divested the railroad of its interest in the
property it purchased from Mary Knox"5" prior to her death.5 1 The
exclusion of the roadbed from the year's support was significant, and
while the special master properly concluded how Mary Knox could have
obtained a fee simple title, the special master should have analyzed
further to determine "whether the roadbed property was excluded from
the year's support award and, if so, whether that exclusion also
encompassed the disputed property." 2 Accordingly, the supreme court
reversed the trial court's order.5"
In Ponder v. Ponder,54 the supreme court addressed multiple land
estate issues.5 5 There, Stanley Ponder brought a quiet title action
against his deceased father's second wife and her children to establish
ownership interest in four tracts of land that had been owned by the
father who died intestate in 1980. Ponder was the son of the decedent
and his first wife, whose brief marriage ended in divorce. At the time
of his death, decedent was survived by his wife, Kyoto, and her three
children, as well as Ponder.56
In 1981 Kyoto filed a petition in probate court for an order declaring
no administration necessary. The petition listed herself and her three
children as the decedent's only heirs at law. Ponder was not named as
an heir, nor was he notified of the proceeding. 7 "Following notice and
advertisement, the probate court entered an order declaring no
administration necessary." 8 Just two months before Kyoto filed the
petition, Ponder attended the wedding of one of Kyoto's children. Kyoto

47. Id., 577 S.E.2d at 567-68.
48. Id., 577 S.E.2d at 568.
49. Id. at 247-48, 577 S.E.2d at 568.
50. Id. at 248, 577 S.E.2d at 568.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 248-49, 577 S.E.2d at 568.
54. 275 Ga. 616, 571 S.E.2d 343 (2002).
55. Id. at 616-20, 571 S.E.2d at 343-47.
56. Id. at 616, 571 S.E.2d at 344.
57. Id., 571 S.E.2d at 345.
58. Id.
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was present, but she did not notify Ponder of the petition. Soon after
the probate court's order, Kyoto and her children exchanged various
documents to establish a division of the fee simple title among themselves, and those instruments were duly recorded. 9
That Ponder was recognized by decedent as his child in a divorce
proceeding and that Kyoto knew of Ponder's existence was not disputed.
Evidence was also presented that in 1954, Ponder's mother relieved the
decedent from paying child support and in 1977, Ponder visited with his
father and in Kyoto's presence discussed whether decedent was, in fact,
Ponder's biological father.6"
In his pleadings, Ponder averred that he did not learn of the probate
proceedings until 1998. Ponder brought suit against Kyoto and her
three children in 1999. On cross-motions for summary judgment, a
special master found as a matter of law that Ponder was a legal heir of
decedent and inherited a child's portion of the estate. The special
master also found that Ponder's interest was not divested by the probate
court's order of no administration necessary because Ponder's existence
had been concealed from the probate court. The special master further
found no fraud in the concealment because Kyoto had a reasonable belief
that Ponder was not her late husband's child; Kyoto and her children
acquired the land based on adverse possession under color of title; and
Ponder's claim was not barred by laches or a statute of limitations
defense. Based on the special master's findings, the trial court granted
summary judgment to Kyoto and her children and denied Ponder's
summary judgment motion. All parties appealed. 1
The trial court determined that Ponder was an heir at law of the
decedent and, therefore, was a tenant in common to the property with
Kyoto and her children.62 The trial court, therefore, considered the law
governing adverse possessions by cotenants that
[a] party who asserts a claim of title by adverse possession against a
cotenant has the burden of proving not only the usual elements of
prescription ... but also at least one of the elements of [the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section] 44-6-123, which
provides as follows: "There may be no adverse possession against a
cotenant until the adverse possessor effects an actual ouster, retains

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 616-17, 571 S.E.2d at 345.
Id.
Id. at 617, 571 S.E.2d at 345.
Id. at 618, 571 S.E.2d at 345.
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exclusive possession after
demand, or gives his cotenant express notice
63
of adverse possession."
However, in applying this exception, "'[t]he key factor to be considered
is whether the party in possession either expressly or impliedly
recognizes his status as cotenant. If he does not and holds possession
under a deed which purports to convey the entire fee, the conditions of
[O.C.G.A. section 44-6-123] do not apply.'"4 Accordingly, the supreme
court reasoned that although Kyoto and her children openly and
continuously used the property, questions of fact remained as to whether
they took the property with knowledge that there was a tenancy in
common with Ponder.6 5
Without such knowledge, the cotenancy
66
exception of O.C.G.A. section 44-6-123 would not apply.
The court also considered whether Kyoto and her children's "possession originated in fraud which would prevent the running of prescriptive
title,"6 7 and whether they satisfied at least one of the statutory
conditions.68s The court held that the trial court erred in determining
as a matter of law that Kyoto and the children acquired prescriptive title
against Ponder because "exclusive possession by a cotenant alone will be
presumed not an adverse holding, but simply one in support of the
common title."6 9
The supreme court next reviewed whether the order declaring no
administration necessary and the deeds between Kyoto and her children
were sufficient "writings to constitute color of title upon which prescriptive title could be based under O.C.G.A. [section] 44-5-164. "7 0 Recognizing that color of title is a writing that, among other things, requires that
the possessor of land in good faith claim title, the court opined that
[tihe type of fraud which would vitiate the good faith requirement...
of prescription has been described as "not legal but moral fraud, a
consciousness of doing wrong. To defeat prescriptive title, the fraud of
the party claiming thereunder must be such as to charge his conscience. He must
be cognizant of the fraud, not by constructive but by
71
actual notice."

63. 275 Ga. at 618, 571 S.E.2d at 346 (quoting Wright v. Wright, 270 Ga. 530, 532, 512
S.E.2d 618, 620 (1999)).
64. Id. (quoting Mattison v. Barbano, 249 Ga. 271, 272, 290 S.E.2d 41, 42-43 (1982)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 619, 571 S.E.2d at 346 (citing Erwin v. Miller, 203 Ga. 58, 45 S.E.2d 192
(1947)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Graham v. Lanier, 179 Ga. 744, 745-46, 177 S.E. 574, 575 (1934)).
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Whether Kyoto and her children swore falsely in the probate court was
a question
of fact, and accordingly, summary judgment was inappropri72
ate.
The court reviewed whether the equitable defense of laches was
applicable to Ponder's claim and held that because Ponder had no notice
that appellees were claiming to be the exclusive owners of the property
until shortly before filing the action, Ponder could not be held conclusively guilty of laches. '3 The jury should make such a determination."
Finally, the appellees' argument that Ponder's claim was barred by a
seven-year statute of limitations was inapplicable because "'[i]n suits to
recover land, there is no statute of limitations in this [s]tate, title by
prescription having been substituted for such statutes.'""
IV. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS & BOUNDARIES

In Lake Arrowhead Property Owners Ass'n v. Dalton,76 the developer
and owners' association alleged violations of the community's restrictive
covenants and filed a complaint to enjoin a real estate agent from
placing "for sale" signs on lots within the community. The restrictive
covenant provided that no such signs were allowed on any lots without
the written consent of the developer, with the exception that the
developer could place his own signs and advertising within the
development as reasonably necessary to sell property. In a bench trial,
the trial court denied the petition for injunction.77
Dalton was a real estate agent and property owner at Lake Arrowhead
and as part of his business placed signs within the development on lots
that he had listed for sale. That Dalton did not place the signs on his
own property was undisputed. Dalton placed signs only on lots
belonging to other property owners. The trial court found that Dalton
did not have permission from the developer to place the signs but denied
a request for injunction finding that the restrictive covenant prohibited
only the "allowance" of signs upon the lots; therefore, the covenant was
directed at the property owner, not realtors. In short, the trial court
found that the association and developer requested the injunction

72. Id., 571 S.E.2d at 347.
73. Id. at 620, 571 S.E.2d at 347.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Latham v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 686, 691, 16 S.E.2d 591, 595 (1941)).
76. 257 Ga. App. 655, 572 S.E.2d 25 (2002).
77. Id. at 655, 572 S.E.2d at 26.
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against the wrong party because the restrictions applied to the
homeowners and not to third parties such as a realtor.78
After analyzing the language of the restrictive covenant, the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that
[blecause restrictive covenants are simply specialized contracts that
run with the land, we begin by looking at the language of the
covenants in question. In so doing, we bear in mind that since
restrictions on private property are generally not favored in Georgia,
they will not be enlarged or extended by construction, and any doubt
will be construed in favor of the grantee.79
"Therefore, '[riestriction on the use of land must be clearly established,
not only as to the restrictions, but also as to the land restricted, and
restrictions will be strictly construed.'"8'
The key to the analysis of the covenant was the use of the word
"allow.""
The court held that "the term 'allow' implies that the
covenant is meant to bar those with the authority to allow signs on the
property," 2 that is, the property owners, not the world in its entirety
8 3
To the extent that the
such as Dalton in his role as a realtor.
meaning was not clear from the language of the covenant, it was
construed against the association and the developer.8 4
In Bickford v. Yancey Development Co.,85 adjoining landowners
brought an action to determine if a 65.1-acre tract owned by a developer
was subject to a restrictive covenant recorded in 1977 requiring a
minimum of two-acre lots. After motions,
the trial court found that
88
there was no restrictive covenant in force.
The court of appeals held that the facts regarding the real property
itself were not in dispute. 7 The issue was whether the covenants
recorded in 1977 were automatically renewed in 1993 by enactment of
O.C.G.A. section 44-5-60(d)(1).88 The court determined that the statute

78. Id. at 655-56, 572 S.E.2d at 26.
79. Id. at 656, 572 S.E.2d at 26 (quoting Duffy v. Landings Ass'n, 245 Ga. App. 104,
106-07, 536 S.E.2d 758, 761 (2000)).
80. Id. (quoting Roth v. Connor, 235 Ga. App. 866, 867 510 S.E.2d 550, 555 (1999)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 258 Ga. App. 371, 574 S.E.2d 349 (2002).
86. Id. at 371-72, 574 S.E.2d at 350.
87. Id. at 372, 574 S.E.2d at 350.
88. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)(1) (1993).
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did not renew the covenant, citing Canterbury Forest Ass'n v. Collins,89
which held that
"the automatic renewal provision of [O.C.G.A. section] 44-5-60(d), as
amended in 1993, does not apply to the covenants [that arose prior to
1993], so that the covenants expired [on November 2, 1997,] after 20
years pursuant to [O.C.G.A. section] 44-5-60(b). This finding is based
upon the fact that the covenants were adopted in [1977], before the
automatic renewal provision was adopted in 1993." 90
The automatic renewal statute cannot be applied retroactively because
doing so would be unconstitutional. 91 Therefore, the restrictions lapsed,
and the adjoining landowner was not required to abide by the two-acre
lot requirement. s2
In Patterson v. Powell,93 the court of appeals analyzed permanent,
irrevocable easements as appurtenant to the purchase of property.9 4
In 1974 the Powells purchased property adjoining Lake Frank from C.
T. Wessinger, the developer of the subdivision. The Powells were the
first purchasers in the subdivision, and Wessinger relocated his
driveway so the Powells could take advantage of the lake. A subdivision
plat shows the Powells' property as adjoining the lake, but Wessinger
maintained title to the lake itself. A 1971 protective covenant provided
that Lake Frank homeowners could use the lake. This covenant expired
on its own terms in 1996. 95
In 1989 Wessinger sold a lot to Patterson. The Patterson tract
included the lake and a parcel of the land adjoining the lake. As the
new owner of the lake, Patterson informed the Powells that they could
no longer use the lake.9" "The Powells sued to establish their right to
use the lake and to enjoin [Patterson] from interfering with that
right."97 The trial court found that "the Powells were entitled to use
the lake because they acquired a permanent easement as an appurtenance to the purchase of their property."9 8 The trial court held that

89. 243 Ga. App. 425, 426-27, 532 S.E.2d 736, 738 (2000).
90. Bickford, 258 Ga. App. at 373, 574 S.E.2d at 351 (quoting Collins, 243 Ga. App. at
426-27, 532 S.E.2d at 739).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 257 Ga. App. 336, 571 S.E.2d 400 (2002).
94. Id. at 336-40, 571 S.E.2d at 400-03.
95. Id. at 336, 571 S.E.2d at 401.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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"the Powells' right to use and enjoy the lake was an express grant and
an irrevocable property right ....
On appeal, the Pattersons contended that the Powells' right to use the
lake was limited to those rights set forth in the protective covenants
which had expired in 1996.100 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court, holding that because the Powells' easement rights were not
established by the covenant but by the subdivision plat, an irrevocable
easement was created. 10 1
"It is well-established that where a developer sells lots according to a
recorded plat, the grantees acquire an easement in any areas set apart
for their use. An easement acquired in this manner is considered an
express grant, and is an irrevocable property right. The rationale is
that the grantees of the property have given consideration for its
enhanced value in the increased price of their lots." 2
The subdivision plat, rather than an easement, created the right of the
Powells;3 therefore, the new owners could not interfere with that
10
right.

V. CONTRACTS & BROKERS
A defective swimming pool was at issue in Ainsworth v. Perreault.'°
The Perreaults had the pool installed in 1989. In 1994 the bottom of the

pool ruptured, requiring extensive repairs
installed the pool. After the repairs, the
problems with the pool. The Perreaults
Ainsworths in 1996. As part of the sale,

by the company that had
Perreaults had no further
sold the property to the
the Perreaults provided a

seller's property disclosure statement, which did not mention the prior
problems with the pool. Prior to the sale, an inspector hired by the
Ainsworths determined that the pool was in good condition. The sales
contract contained a standard merger clause. In the fall of 1997, the
Ainsworths observed that one corner of the pool was settling. They hired
a geotechnical engineer who determined that the pool was constructed
on uncompacted fill and that there was a subsurface cavity under the
pool's foundation caused by the large volume of water that had

previously escaped from the pool.'0 5
99.
100.
101.
102.
S.E.2d
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 337, 571 S.E.2d at 401 (quoting Walker v. Duncan, 236 Ga. 331, 332, 223
675, 677 (1976)).
Id. at 338, 571 S.E.2d at 402.
254 Ga. App. 470, 563 S.E.2d 135 (2002).
Id. at 470-71, 563 S.E.2d at 136-37.
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The Ainsworths did not repair the pool; instead in 1998, they offered
to rescind the sales contract. The Perreaults refused. In 1999 the
Ainsworths sued the Perreaults for damages for fraud and breach of
contract.
The superior court granted summary judgment to the
Perreaults. °6
The court of appeals affirmed, focusing on the merger clause in the
sales contract. 17 The court held that due to the merger clause, the
Ainsworths could not base their fraud claim on representations that did
not appear in the contract.'l 8 The court held that the fact that the
seller's property disclosure statement was attached to and mentioned in
the contract did not change this result. 10 9 The disclosure statement
was not incorporated into the contract, and thus, evidence regarding it
had to be excluded due to the merger clause." ° The court also held
that the Perreaults were not required to disclose the prior repairs to the
swimming pool."' Instead, sellers are only required to inform potential buyers about current defects of which they are aware.11
In Lifestyle Family, L.R v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.,1 ' the
court faced a dispute over real estate commissions.1 In 1996 Eastern
Airline Pension Fund retained Carter Holdings, Inc. (Carter) to find a
buyer for a 130-acre tract of land. Carter began negotiations with
Lifestyle Family, L.P. and Mansour Properties, L.L.C. to purchase the
entire property. Southeastern Partners, Inc. (Southeastern), a real
estate brokerage, contacted Carter on behalf of Unisource Worldwide,
Inc. (Unisource), which wanted to purchase a thirty-acre portion of the
property. The pension fund, however, wanted to sell the entire property
and entered into an agreement
to sell the property to Lifestyle and
115
Mansour for $3.5 million.
Prior to finalizing this agreement, Carter notified Lifestyle and
Mansour of Unisource's interest in purchasing a portion of the property.
Lifestyle's principal, Sam Leveto, requested that Carter solicit an offer
from Unisource. Southeastern, acting on behalf of Unisource, submitted
an offer of $2.25 million. The offer required the sellers to pay a
commission of ten percent to the two brokers. Lifestyle and Mansour

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 471, 563 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 477, 563 S.E.2d at 141.
Id. at 472, 562 S.E.2d at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 474, 563 S.E.2d at 139.
Id. at 475, 563 S.E.2d at 140.
256 Ga. App. 305, 568 S.E.2d 171 (2002).
Id. at 305-13, 568 S.E.2d at 171-78.
Id. at 305-06, 568 S.E.2d at 173.
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held a meeting with Unisource but decided not to negotiate with
Unisource until after their purchase of the property closed." 6
Following the closing, Lifestyle and Mansour contacted Southeastern
for a meeting. Carter's representative was not at the meeting, in which
Lifestyle and Mansour informed Southeastern that Carter represented
them. Lifestyle and Mansour demanded $3 million for the tract and
offered a commission of $80,000. Ultimately, Lifestyle and Mansour
agreed to sell the property to Unisource for $3 million and to pay
Southeastern a commission of $110,000. The contract also called for
Southeastern to hold Lifestyle and Mansour harmless from the claims
of any other real estate brokers. Neither Southeastern nor Carter signed
this contract." 7
At closing Southeastern signed a wavier of any claims against
Lifestyle and Mansour in exchange for the $110,000. This sum, along
with approximately $40,000, was placed in escrow with Lawyers Title
Insurance Corp. After attempts to settle the commission dispute failed,
Lawyer's Title filed an interpleader action. The trial court dismissed
Lawyer's Title and realigned the parties with Carter as plaintiff,
Lifestyle and Mansour as defendants, and Southeastern as third-party
defendant. Carter and Southeastern settled with each other before trial.
At trial the court directed a verdict for Southeastern in the amount of
$110,000. The jury returned a verdict for Carter on a breach of contract
claim against Lifestyle and Mansour in the amount of $150,000. The
jury also found that no indemnification agreement existed between
Southeastern and Lifestyle and Mansour. Lifestyle and Mansour filed
a motion for new trial as to Carter and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to Southeastern. The trial court denied both
motions."1 8
On appeal Lifestyle and Mansour argued that they had not entered
into a contract to pay commissions to Carter."9 The court of appeals
found no evidence to support the jury's verdict that Lifestyle and
Mansour had contracted to pay commissions to Carter.2 ° The court
remanded for a retrial on Carter's quantum meruit claim, holding that
the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions Act did not
eradicate the common law concept of procuring cause and, thus, did not

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

306, 568 S.E.2d at
306-07, 568 S.E.2d
307-08, 568 S.E.2d
308, 568 S.E.2d at
309, 568 S.E.2d at

173.
at 173-74.
at 174.
175.
176.
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eliminate Carter's quantum meruit claim."' The court of appeals
affirmed the directed verdict in favor of Southeastern.12 2
VI.

FORECLOSURE

Venue was the issue in First American Title Insurance Co. v.
Broadstreet.'2' Washtenaw Mortgage Company loaned Mr. Broadstreet
$40,000, secured by a security deed on residential property in Carroll
County. Washtenaw purchased title insurance from First American as
part of the transaction. Later, First American purchased Washtenaw's
interest in the loan as part of a settlement of a title insurance claim.
When First American initiated foreclosure proceedings, Ms. Broadstreet
filed suit in Carroll County seeking to set aside the security deed and to
enjoin the foreclosure. First American moved to dismiss or transfer
venue, arguing that venue was not proper in Carroll County. Following
a hearing on Ms. Broadstreet's motion for an interlocutory injunction to
prohibit the foreclosure, Ms. Broadstreet amended her complaint to add
a quiet title claim. The superior court denied First American's motion
to dismiss or transfer venue and granted Ms. Broadstreet's motion for an
interlocutory
injunction. First American then sought an interlocutory
1 24
appeal.

The court of appeals held that the superior court erred in finding that
venue was proper in Carroll County under O.C.G.A. section 33-41(2).125 That statute allows a plaintiff to sue an insurance company in
any county where it has an agent or a place of business. 126 The court
of appeals, however, held that the plain language of the statute limited
this venue provision to claims that arose out of the defendant's role as
an "insurer." 127 Because Ms. Broadstreet's claim arose out of Washtenaw's alleged wrongdoing in the origination of the mortgage, her claim
failed to arise out of First American's role as an insurer.128 The court
of appeals held that O.C.G.A. section 33-4-1(2) did not apply to the case
and that Carroll County was improper venue for an action against a
foreign corporation. 1 29 Instead, venue against such a corporation lied

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 311, 568 S.E.2d at 177.
Id. at 313, 568 S.E.2d at 178.
260 Ga. App. 705, 580 S.E.2d 676 (2003).
Id. at 705-06, 580 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. at 707, 580 S.E.2d at 678; O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1(2) (2000).
260 Ga. App. at 706, 580 S.E.2d at 677-78; O.C.G.A. § 33-4-1(2).
260 Ga. App. at 706, 580 S.E.2d at 678.
Id., 580 S.E.2d at 677.
Id. at 707, 580 S.E.2d at 678.
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"'in the county where its attorney in fact [was] a resident.'"' 3 ° Because
"a court without venue lacks authority to issue an injunction,""' the
court of appeals held that the superior court erred3 2 in granting Ms.
Broadstreet's motion for an interlocutory injunction.
In Boaz v. Latson,133 the court of appeals addressed claims of fraud,
wrongful foreclosure, and slander of title."M Darrell Boaz retained
attorney Latson to represent him in a legal matter. In August 1994 a
third party told Darrell that Latson needed his signature on an affidavit
for his case. The third party had Darrell sign a piece of paper containing only a signature line and a blank notary stamp. The Boazes alleged
that Latson used this signature to create a promissory note in favor of
Latson in the amount of $20,246.44. Latson recorded the promissory
note on the public record in March 1995. In 2001 Latson sought
payment on the note and commenced foreclosure proceedings against
property jointly owned by Darrell and his wife, Carolyn Boaz. The
of title.
Boazes sued alleging fraud, wrongful foreclosure, and slander
135
Latson.
to
judgment
summary
granted
court
The superior
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the
fraud claim, finding that the claim was barred by the applicable statute
of limitations.1 3 6 The court also noted that the Boazes had not adLatson was attemptduced any evidence to show that the security deed
137
fraud.
by
obtained
been
had
on
foreclose
to
ing
The court reversed the summary judgment on the wrongful foreclosure
claim.138 The court determined that the Boazes' claim that Latson began
foreclosure proceedings on an allegedly fraudulent debt constituted a
claim for wrongful foreclosure under Georgia law. 3 9 The court rejected
Latson's argument that Carolyn Boaz lacked standing to bring the
wrongful foreclosure claim because she was not a party to the promissory note at issue. 40 The court held that Carolyn Boaz had an interest
in the property being foreclosed, and that interest gave her standing to

130. Id. (quoting Lingo v. Worcester County Inst. for Sav., 171 Ga. App. 892, 892, 321
S.E.2d 744, 745 (1984)).
131. Id. (citing Miller v. Bryant, 266 Ga. 584, 468 S.E.2d 762 (1996)).
132. Id.
133. 260 Ga. App. 752, 580 S.E.2d 572 (2003).
134. Id. at 752-60, 580 S.E.2d at 572-79.
135. Id. at 752-54, 580 S.E.2d at 574-75.
136. Id. at 754-55, 580 S.E.2d at 575-76.
137. Id. at 755, 580 S.E.2d at 576.
138. Id. at 756, 580 S.E.2d at 577.
139. Id. at 757, 580 S.E.2d at 577.
140. Id.
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sue for wrongful foreclosure.""
The court also rejected Latson's
argument that the wrongful foreclosure claim was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. 142 The court held that the wrongful
foreclosure claim did not accrue until Latson initiated foreclosure
proceedings and that the Boazes' suit, brought a scant two days after
that occurrence, was timely.143
The court also rejected Latson's arguments regarding the Boazes'
slander of title claim. 1" Latson argued that this claim was also barred
by the statute of limitations and that his foreclosure notice was
privileged.1 45 The court rejected the privilege argument, holding that
no authority precluded a slander of title claim based on a published
foreclosure notice. 46 Because the foreclosure notice had been published within the applicable statute of limitations, the court of appeals
reversed the superior court's ruling that the slander of title claim was
147
time-barred.
VII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

In Cannon v. Wesley PlantationApartments,48 the court of appeals
addressed a fight over a security deposit.' 49 Cannon rented an apartment at Wesley Plantation in April 1998, paying a $100 security deposit.
Cannon informed Wesley Plantation that he intended to surrender the
apartment on September 1, 1999. That same day, a Wesley Plantation
employee conducted a walk-through of Canon's apartment and noted
damage beyond normal wear and tear. The employee filled out a form
noting the damaged areas and asked Cannon to sign it. Cannon refused
to sign the form. 5 °
The cost of the needed repairs exceeded the amount of Cannon's
security deposit. Within three days of the walk-through, Wesley
Plantation mailed Cannon notice that it intended to retain his security
deposit and demanded funds to cover the additional cost of repairs. In
May 2000 Cannon sued Wesley Plantation seeking return of his security

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. at 758, 580 S.E.2d at 578.
Id.
Id. at 759, 580 S.E.2d at 579.
Id.
Id.
Id.
256 Ga. App. 244, 568 S.E.2d 137 (2002).
Id. at 244, 568 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 245, 568 S.E.2d at 138.
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deposit. After a bench trial, the superior court granted judgment to
Wesley Plantation.' 5'
Cannon appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that
Wesley Plantation had complied with O.C.G.A. section 44-7-33.152
That statute requires landlords to inspect the apartment within three
days after a tenant surrenders it and to notify the former tenant of its
intent to retain the security deposit within one month of the later of the
surrender of the property or the termination of the lease. 1 3 Cannon
argued that Wesley Plantation had not complied with the statute
because he never received a copy of the notice."M The court of appeals
rejected this argument, holding that the statute merely required the
landlord to mail the notice to the former tenant at his or her last known
address via first class mail.'5 5 The statute does not require that the
notice actually be received by the tenant. 5 6 The
court of appeals
157
therefore affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
In Wilbanks v. Arthur,5 ' the court of appeals addressed a tenant's
challenge to his landlord's title in the context of a summary dispossessory proceeding."'
The landlord, Elizabeth Arthur, and the tenant,
Sandy Wilbanks, were sister and brother. The property at issue had
been owned by their father. Upon the father's death in 1968, the
property was awarded as year's support to his wife, Wilda, and their
minor child, Elizabeth Arthur. In 1969 all interested parties, including
Sandy, deeded the property to Arthur, reserving a life estate for Wilda
Wilbanks. In 1972 Wilda Wilbanks deeded her remaining interest in the
160
property to Arthur.
Wilda Wilbanks continued to live on the property. In 1995 Sandy
moved to the property at his mother's request. Subsequently, his sister,
Arthur, filed a dispossessory proceeding against him. Sandy's defense
claimed that Arthur had lost title to their mother's property through
adverse possession. The trial court found that Sandy Wilbanks was a
tenant at sufferance and could not raise an alleged defect in his
landlord's title as a defense to a dispossessory proceeding. Sandy

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 246-47, 568 S.E.2d at 138-39; O.C.G.A. § 44-7-33 (1991).
256 Ga. App. at 247, 568 S.E.2d at 139; O.C.G.A. § 44-7-33.
256 Ga. App. at 247, 568 S.E.2d at 139.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 139-40.
Id.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 140.
257 Ga. App. 226, 570 S.E.2d 664 (2002).
Id. at 226-28, 570 S.E.2d at 664-66.
Id. at 226, 570 S.E.2d at 664-65.
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trial court erred by not addressing his claim
appealed, alleging that16 the
1
of adverse possession.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that Sandy's
claim that there was no landlord-tenant relationship was an appropriate
defense to the dispossessory proceeding." 2 The court held that the
trial court erred in not addressing Sandy's adverse possession claim.'63
Because evidence concerning that claim was conflicting, the court
remanded the case and ordered the trial court to determine whether
Arthur lost title through adverse possession."
VIII.

ZONING

In Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n, 16' a
developers' association "challenged Cherokee County's impact fee
ordinance ... as unconstitutional and contrary to the enabling statute."16 The central issue was "the county's failure to impose impact
fees on new developments in incorporated portions of the county even
though those developments would benefit from new facilities constructed
with the impact fees obtained from new developments in unincorporated
portions."'67 The court of appeals first noted that the county did not
have the statutory power to impose impact fees on new developments in
incorporated portions of the county."6 Therefore, "the county acted
rationally and reasonably in imposing impact fees on only those
developments over which it had the power to impose fees."169 To reach
this conclusion, the court reviewed Cherokee County's impact fee
ordinance, which closely tracked the language of O.C.G.A. section 3671-117' and "required persons constructing new developments in the
7'
county to pay an impact fee before receiving a building permit.""
The Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Association ("the Association"),
which represented local developers, "sought a declaratory judgment that
the ordinance as applied did not comport with the enabling statute and

161. Id. at 226-27, 570 S.E.2d at 665.
162. Id. at 227, 570 S.E.2d at 665.
163. Id. at 228, 570 S.E.2d at 666.
164. Id.
165. 255 Ga. App. 764, 566 S.E.2d 470 (2002).
166. Id. at 764, 566 S.E.2d at 472.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. O.C.G.A. §§ 36-71-1 to -13 (2002).
171. 255 Ga. App. at 765, 566 S.E.2d at 472; Cherokee County Ordinance Code § 25;
see also O.C.G.A. §§ 36-71-1 to -13.
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violated due process and equal protection principles.' 72 The trial
court denied the Association's motion for summary judgment. After a
bench trial, the trial court upheld the ordinance as constitutional and
consistent with the statute. The trial court found unfair the portion of
the ordinance that did not impose the fees on developments in incorporated portions of the county that would benefit from the facilities
generated by the fees. The court therefore restrained the county from
collecting the impact fees designated for libraries, road services, and
parks and recreation until the county devised a system to exclude the
non-fee payers from benefitting from these improvements. Both parties
appealed.1 73
The court of appeals looked to Georgia's enabling statute, which
authorizes counties and cities that have adopted a Capital Improvements
Element in their comprehensive county plans to collect impact fees for
new developments.' 74 The fees imposed by the counties
are not to exceed a proportionate share of the cost of system improvements . . . and are to be calculated on the basis of (i) service areas
defined by the county on the basis of sound planning or engineering
principles ... and (ii) levels of service for public facilities applicable to
existing development and to new growth and development.' 75
The court held that the Cherokee County ordinance closely tracked the
language of the statute and established
the service areas for each
176
category as required by the statute.
Regarding the Association's primary complaint that the county
improperly imposed the fees only on new developments in the unincorporated portions of the county, the court held that due process and equal
protection provisions were not violated as such constitutional guarantees
do "'not prevent a reasonable classification relating to the purpose of the
legislation.'' 77 The enabling statute authorized Cherokee County to
impose an impact fee as a condition of development approval. The
impact fee was to be collected when the county issued the building
permit. The county's authority to require development approval through
a building permit was restricted to development in unincorporated

172. 255 Ga. App. at 765, 566 S.E.2d at 472.
173. Id., 566 S.E.2d at 472-73.
174. Id. at 766, 566 S.E.2d at 473; see O.C.G.A. § 36-71-3(a) (2000).
175. 255 Ga. App. at 766, 566 S.E.2d at 473 (citations omitted).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 766-67, 566 S.E.2d at 474 (quoting Reed v. Hopper, 235 Ga. 298, 300, 219
S.E.2d 409, 412 (1975)).
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portions of the county by the limitations in O.C.G.A. section 36-7111.178

The Association also argued that the county ordinance and Capital
Improvements Element of the county's comprehensive plan did not
comply with the enabling statute and that the fees were improperly
calculated. 179 The court disagreed, noting that the county had procedures in place to carefully project the county's growth and then properly
calculated the impact fees on the basis that all new development
throughout the county, not just in unincorporated
areas, would pay
180
impact fees to cover county improvements.
In Garden Hills Civic Ass'n v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit
Authority, 8' the court of appeals held that a local civic organization
and homeowner's association lacked standing to challenge rezoning.'
The Garden Hills Civic Association ("the Association") and six homeowners sued Atlanta's rapid transit authority, the city of Atlanta, and others
(collectively "MARTA"), "alleging that the rezoning of approximately
forty-seven acres in Atlanta was illegal and unconstitutional."' 83
Following a bench trial, the court found that the Association and
homeowners lacked standing to bring the zoning claims and even if they
had standing, no legal basis for reversing the zoning decision existed."& The trial court based its conclusion that the Association and
homeowners lacked standing on the fact that the only homeowner who
testified at trial "failed to demonstrate that she sustained special
damages as a result of the zoning decision. With respect to the
[Association], the trial court concluded that the [A]ssociation lacked
independent standing to file suit because [the Association itself] did not
own property affected by the rezoning."'
The court of appeals looked to the two-part test established by the
supreme court to test standing in rezoning cases.8 6 "First, the
aggrieved party 'must have a substantial interest in the zoning decision,
and second, ... this interest [must] be in danger of suffering some
special damage or injury not common to all property owners similarly

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
(1984)).

Id. at 767-68, 566 S.E.2d at 474.
Id. at 770, 566 S.E.2d at 476.
Id.
256 Ga. App. 367, 568 S.E.2d 586 (2002).
Id. at 369, 568 S.E.2d at 590.
Id. at 367, 568 S.E.2d at 586.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 586-87.
Id., 568 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. (citing Dekalb County v. Wapensky, 253 Ga. 47, 48, 315 S.E.2d 873, 875
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situated. ' 8 7
The court held that the record did not support the
Association and homeowners' argument that they were harmed in such
a way as to demonstrate the required special damages. 8 The homeowner who testified at trial stated that because the rezoned property
was being developed for use as offices, housing, and retail shopping, she
would suffer from an increase in the level of noise, light, traffic, crime,
and pollution. A real estate appraiser also testified that the development would decrease the value of the homeowners' property. Appellants'
argument, therefore, was that the rezoning led to the development,
which thus diminished their property values.8 9 The court, however,
held that appellants failed to acknowledge that the property could have
been developed as proposed under existing zoning and that "appellants
were subject to the same harm regardless of whether the property was
rezoned." 9 ° The court ended its opinion stating that "appellants' true
complaint is not that the property was rezoned, but that it will be
developed at all. However, such development is to be expected in a
thriving urban community.
And the increase in inconveniences
stemming from urban growth-such as increased traffic-is insufficient
to confer standing."' 9'
IX. TRESPASS
In Sumitomo Corp. of America v. Deal,192 Deal and Montgomery
were downstream neighbors who brought suit against Sumimoto, SMG
Development Associates, and Atlantic Hills Corporation (collectively
"SMG") for damage to their property allegedly caused by surface water
runoff from developer's manmade detention pond. After trial the jury
found SMG liable for continuing trespass, nuisance, and damages for
surface water invasion onto the Deal and Montgomery land. A jury
awarded the Deals compensatory damages, attorney fees, and punitive
damages. The Montgomerys were awarded compensatory damages and
attorney fees. The trial court reduced the jury award for punitive
damages awarded to the Deals. SMG and the Deals appealed. 93
At trial, the court instructed the jury as follows:

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. (quoting Wapensky, 253 Ga. at 48, 315 S.E.2d at 875).
Id. at 368, 568 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. at 367-68, 568 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. at 368, 568 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. at 368-69, 568 S.E.2d at 587-88 (citations omitted).
256 Ga. App. 703, 569 S.E.2d 608 (2002).
Id. at 703-04, 569 S.E.2d at 611.
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One landed proprietor has no right to concentrate and collect water
and thus cause it to be discharged upon the land of a lower proprietor
in greater quantities at a particular locality or in a manner different
from that in which the water would be received by the lower property
if it simply 9ran
down upon it from the upper property by the law of
4
gravitation.
SMG argued that the instruction was in error and claimed that Georgia
law governing surface water invasion was "arcane" and that it "'stifles
potential development and subjects project developers to liability for
converting raw, rural land to modern urbanized development."" 9 5
SMG sought the replacement of the Georgia rule with the reasonable use
rule of other states, which allows "'the benefits and burdens of development to be shared by the community."" 9 6 SMG specifically pointed to
Missouri's law as guidance. 97 The court of appeals noted that even if
it agreed with SMG's argument, the court had no authority to overrule
a decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. 98 The court therefore held
that the trial court did not err in failing to charge a Georgia jury on
Missouri's law.' 99
In a second enumeration of error, SMG contended that because
Sumitomo was only a shareholder in the developer's corporate investors,
the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict or enter a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Sumitomo. 00 After analyzing
whether Sumitomo could be held liable for nuisance, the court of appeals
held that the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict or enter
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.2 '
Under Georgia law to be
liable for nuisance, "'[o]wnership of land by the tortfeasor is not an
element, but control is; the essential element of nuisance is control over
the cause of the harm. The tortfeasor must be either the cause or a
concurrent cause of the creation, continuance, or maintenance of the
22
nuisance."'

194. Id. at 705, 569 S.E.2d at 611. See Gill v. First Christian Church, 216 Ga. 454, 117
S.E.2d 164 (1960).
195. 256 Ga. App. at 705, 569 S.E.2d at 612.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 706, 569 S.E.2d at 612-13.
201. Id. at 706-07, 569 S.E.2d at 613.
202. Id. at 707, 569 S.E.2d at 613 (quoting Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 239 Ga. App.
362, 366, 522 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1999)).
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Trial testimony showed that Sumitomo had an eighty percent
ownership interest in Atlantic Hills, and other evidence showed that
these parties were closely related in business. 203 The court of appeals
held that the "any evidence" standard applied and that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Sumitomo exercised enough
control in the decision regarding the detention pond to hold it liable for
damages. 0 4
SMG's third enumeration of error claimed that the trial court erred in
failing to grant either a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (j.n.o.v.) in favor of all defendants on the Deals' nuisance
theory of liability.2 5 Based on the proposition

"(t]hat which the law authorizes to
2 6 be done, if done as the law
authorizes, cannot be a nuisance,"

... SMG argue[d] that the

development of Hamilton Mill was a lawful and permissible use of its
property, and that no part of the project was done unlawfully or
contrary to what the appropriate governing authorities permitted. In
other words, "[tihe project was authorized and executed
in accordance
20 7
with law and cannot, therefore, be a nuisance."
The court looked to the statutory definition of nuisance and found that
the statute itself contradicted SMG's argument.2 8 O.C.G.A. section
41-1-1 provides: "A nuisance is anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another and the fact that the act done
may
20 9
otherwise be lawful shall not keep it from being a nuisance."
"In its fourth enumeration of error, SMG contend[ed] that the trial
court erred in permitting the Deals' trespass theory to go to the jury
because trespass requires proof of the property's value before and after
the trespass, and the Deals failed to provide"2 1 ° such evidence.21'
The court rejected this argument and cited to precedent, which held,
"'the cost of repair often has been held to be an appropriate measure of
damages in cases involving a continuing nuisance or trespass.' 212 The
trial record showed that the Deals presented extensive testimony on the
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costs of repairing the damage to their property caused by water flowing
from 4 the detention pond. 213
Accordingly, the trial court did not
21

err.

Regarding the reduction of the punitive damages, the court applied a
de novo standard of review.215 The three criteria for reviewing punitive damages are: "'(1) the degree or reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct, (2) the disparity between the harm (or potential harm)
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.' ' 216 Applying this three-prong test, the court held that the trial court erred in
reducing the punitive damages and remanded the case to that court for
reinstatement of the damages.217
X.

TAXATION

Attorney fees for a successful appeal from the board of equalization's
assessment of property value were at issue in Morrison v. Cobb County
Board of Tax Assessors.28
The Morrisons filed an appeal of the
assessed value of their property to the board of equalization in 1999.
The board of equalization upheld the assessment, and the Morrisons
appealed that ruling to the superior court. The Morrisons were
successful in their superior court appeal and subsequently moved for
costs and attorney fees incurred pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 48-5311(g)(4)(B)(ii). 219 The trial court denied the motion for attorney fees,
holding that the statute did not apply to the Morrisons' appeal.22 °
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.221 The
court found that prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. section 48-5-311(g),
no statutory provision allowed recovery of costs or attorney fees in tax
appeals.2 2 The 1999 act, which became O.C.G.A. section 48-5-311(g),
stated that "'[tihis Act shall become effective on January 1, 2000, and
shall be applicable to all assessments and proceedings commenced on or

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 709, 569 S.E.2d at 614.
216. Id., 569 S.E.2d at 614-15 (quoting Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532
U.S. 424, 440 (2001)).
217. Id. at 711, 569 S.E.2d at 616.
218. 258 Ga. App. 697, 697-99, 574 S.E.2d 888, 888-89 (2002).
219. O.C.G.A. §48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) (2000).
220. 258 Ga. App. at 698, 574 S.E.2d at 888-89.
221. Id. at 699, 574 S.E.2d at 889.
222. Id. at 698, 574 S.E.2d at 889.
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after that date.'"22 ' The Morrisons argued that because their superior
court appeal was filed after January 1, 2000, the attorney fees provision
should apply to their appeal. 224 The court of appeals rejected this
argument, holding that the Morrisons commenced their proceedings
when they filed their appeal to the board of equalization, not when they
appealed the board of equalization's ruling to the superior court.22 5
Because their appeal to the board of equalization was filed in 1999,
O.C.G.A. section 48-5-311(g) did not apply, and they could not recover
costs or attorney fees.226
Attorney fees for a successful tax appeal were also at issue in Fulton
County Board of Tax Assessors v. Butner.227 The county board of tax
assessors valued Butner's property at $1,222,600. Butner appealed this
valuation to the county board of equalization, which valued the property
at $1,129,100. Butner appealed that valuation to the superior court. A
jury verdict valued the property at $950,000. As this amount was less
than eighty-five percent of the board of equalization's valuation, Butner
moved for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii).
Butner's motion was supported by an affidavit from her counsel with
statements of her account attached. The board of tax assessors
responded to the motion, alleging that Butner was not entitled to
attorney fees because she had not returned the property for taxation as
required by O.C.G.A. section 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). Without holding a
hearing, the trial court granted Butner's motion and awarded attorney
fees of $7515. The board of tax assessors appealed.228
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred by awarding
attorney fees without first holding an evidentiary hearing.229 The
court held that such a hearing was required to allow the board of tax
assessors to "'challenge testimony as to the value and need for legal
services. '"'2.0 The court rejected Butner's arguments that no hearing
was required under Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 and that the board
had waived its right to a hearing.'
The court of appeals also held that the trial court did not err in
finding that O.C.G.A. section 48-5-20(a)(2)23 2 applied to the case.233
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That statute provides that a property has been returned for taxation if
real estate transfer tax was paid on the property, and a properly
completed real estate transfer tax form was filed in the preceding tax
year.234 Because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing,
however, no evidence of record existed to demonstrate that Butner
fulfilled the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 48-5-20(a)(2).2 35 The
court of appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. 6
In Burt, Burt & Rentz Retirement Pension Trust v. Dougherty County
Tax Assessors,237 the court of appeals addressed an allegation that the
county tax assessor failed to properly assess the property of utility
companies.2 38 Appellants alleged that the county tax assessor failed
to assess the value of easements held by Georgia Power Company and
Colonial Pipeline Company. The evidence showed that the county tax
assessor relied upon valuations of the utilities' property prepared by the
Georgia Department of Revenue. The revenue department arrived at
that valuation by calculating an overall value of the utility company and
then apportioning that value among the various counties according to
the utility's original investment in each county. The revenue department's focus was on the utility's gross investment in the county because
the department did not have the expertise to value individual assets.
The tax assessor accepted the revenue department's valuation without
further investigation. The superior court, finding nothing wrong with
this practice, granted summary judgment to the tax assessor. 9
The court of appeals rejected appellants' argument that the tax
assessor was required make its own assessment of the value of the
240
The court held that O.C.G.A. section 42-2-18241
utilities' property.
authorized the tax assessor to either adopt or modify the revenue
department's assessment.2 42 The tax assessor was entitled to rely
entirely upon the revenue department's assessment. 2' Therefore, the
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the tax assessor.2 "
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